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More On The New
Federalism In Criminal
Procedure
By DONALD E. WILKES, JR.*
The teachings of the Warren Court concerning the rights
of criminal defendants have not fallen on deaf ears. Many state
judiciaries have greeted the Burger Court's retreat from activ-
ism not with submission, but with a stubborn independence
that displays a determination to keep alive the Warren Court's
philosophical commitment to protection of the criminal sus-
pect.
In an earlier article published in the Kentucky Law
Journal, this author explored the contours of a startling new
development in criminal procedure manifesting the unwilling-
ness of a number of state courts to join in a constriction of the
protections afforded criminal defendants in the Warren era.'
State courts have been evading Burger Court review through
the time-honored doctrine of adequate state grounds, whereby
the Supreme Court refuses to disturb a state court judgment
resting on an adequate state claim.2 In a criminal case, the
state ground alleged to be sufficient to support the judgment
below is typically a state rule of procedure allowing the state
court to disregard an improperly presented federal claim. 3 But
the doctrine also embraces a state judgment resting on ade-
quate state substantive grounds. Thus, the adequate state
ground doctrine permits a state court to immunize its decision
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., 1965,
J.D. 1969, University of Florida.
I Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wilkes].
I An "evasion" case has two characteristics. First, it rests on a state-based right
which at a minimum is coextensive with a federal right. Second, the language of the
opinion or the circumstances in which it was delivered make it apparent that the state
court intended to use the adequate state ground doctrine to avoid Supreme Court
review. See Wilkes, supra note 1, at 436.
3 Id. at 429.
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from Burger Court review by basing its judgment on a state
right which is coextensive with or broader than rights afforded
by federal law.4
[Tihere is not the slightest impropriety when the highest
court of a state invalidates state legislation or state adminis-
trative action as violative of the state constitution. That re-
mains true even where the state constitutional provision is
similar or identical to the Federal Constitution, where the
Federal Constitution's meaning is uncertain, or where the
state court suspects or knows to a certainty that the United
States Supreme Court would reject an analogous federal con-
stitutional claim. Moreover, state courts ought to regard deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting like
provisions of the Federal Constitution as binding only to the
extent the Court's reasoning is intellectually persuasive.
Since the previous article was prepared, the Burger Court
has continued to relax federal constitutional restraints on the
power of police and prosecutorial officials to detect and convict
persons suspected of crime. During the 1973 Term, the fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and sei-
zure appears to have been the principal casualty of the Court's
permissive attitude toward the exercise of governmental au-
thority to enforce criminal laws. Although over half a dozen
search and seizure cases were decided, in not a single one did
the Court find that evidence had been obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment.' Other decisions narrowly interpreted
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 7 and
the sixth amendment right to counsel.' The only federal consti-
tutional rights receiving a liberal construction by the Burger
4 Id. at 430-31, 434-35.
5 Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972, Foreward: The State Consti-
tution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REv. 273, 281-82
(1973).
1 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See also California
Banker's Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974).
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
See, e.g., Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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Court were those guaranteed under the first amendment and
the sixth amendment right to confrontation."0 Moreover, the
Burger Court reasserted its inclination, first manifested in
California v. Green," to set aside state judgments giving too
generous an interpretation to a federal right. 2
The Burger Court's continued reluctance to interfere with
the enforcement of criminal laws has caused state courts to
persist in their attempts at evasion, producing many recent
cases worthy of examination. 3 This emerging "new federalism"
also provokes speculation concerning its continued vitality and
the Supreme Court's probable reaction.
I.
RECENT EVASION CASES
The "evasion" cases under examination may be divided
into two broad categories: cases decided on state grounds alone,
and cases whose judgments were grounded on both federal and
state claims. All but two of the cases based solely on state law
were designed to avoid past holdings of the Burger Court. In
contrast, cases resting on both federal and state grounds ap-
pear to have been framed to evade Burger Court review that
may further limit the claimed federal right.
A. Cases Based Solely on State Grounds
In United States v. Robinson 4 the Supreme Court con-
strued the fourth amendment to permit a police officer making
a custodial arrest for any offense, however minor, to conduct a
full body search of the arrestee, even though the arresting offi-
I See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). But see Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
" 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
2 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Romberger, 417 U.S. 964 (1974).
'3 The majority of the recent "evasion" cases examined herein were reported after
July 1, 1973, the cut-off date for most of the research done on the earlier article.
However, a few of the cases were decided earlier but located only recently while the
present article was being prepared. See, e.g., Parham v. Municipal Court, 199 N.W.2d
501 (S.D. 1972), discussed at notes 44-48 and accompanying text infra.
" 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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cer has no reason to suspect that the search would produce
weapons, evidence, or fruits of the crime. The Court therefore
reinstated a narcotics possession conviction by allowing the
admission of heroin seized from a cigarette package in the re-
spondent's coat pocket pursuant to his arrest for driving with
a revoked driver's license. 5
The Burger Court's-view that the fourth amendment sanc-
tions "a no-holds-barred search after any custodial arrest" 6
was contrary to the preponderance of federal and state case law
on the issue.1 7 Prior to Robinson, a clear majority of state and
lower federal court decisions had refused to categorically vali-
date body searches conducted incident to arrests for traffic or
other minor offenses." Not surprisingly, therefore, it has been
suggested that state courts are free to disagree with Robinson
by furnishing arrestees with a broader scope of protection, pro-
vided it is afforded by rights arising under state law.'" To date,
Hawaii and California appear to be the only states to have
openly adopted this suggestion.
20
'1 In a companion case, Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), the Court
upheld the validity of the body search of a college student made incident to an arrest
for driving without having a driver's license in possession. The search had uncovered
marijuana in a cigarette box.
11 Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Traffic Arrests: State and Federal
Approaches, 26 HAsT. L.J. 536, 537 (1974).
17 Id.
'g Id. at 537-38.
IS Id. at 555-58. See also Harmon & Helbush, Robinson at Large in the Fifty
States: A Continuation of the State Bills of Rights Debate in the Search and Seizure
Contest, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 1, 73-81 (1974); Note, Search Incident to a Traffic
Arrest: The Robinson-Gustafson Reasonable Per Se Rule, 10 TULSA L.J. 256, 266
(1974).
20 A trial court in one other state has refused to follow Robinson. In People v.
Kelly, 353 N.Y.S.2d 111 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1974), the defendant moved to suppress
pills which he was charged with possessing unlawfully and which had been seized from
the underclothing he was wearing by two policemen who arrested him for failing to
display his driver's license. Although the testimony concerning the circumstances of
the arrest was in sharp conflict, the New York City Criminal Court determined the
warrantless arrest to have been valid. The only remaining issue was whether the search
of the defendant's underwear was properly incident to that arrest.
In approaching this issue the court found itself in a "judicial dilemma" because
the precedents were conflicting. Id. at 116. On the one hand, in People v. Marsh, 228
N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967), the New York Court of Appeals had held that
the usual rules regarding searches incident to a lawful arrest were inapplicable to
arrests for traffic violations and that a police officer effecting a traffic arrest was
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In the Hawaii case of State v. Kaluna21 the woman defen-
dant was arrested without a warrant on a charge of attempted
robbery. The male police officers who took her into custody
transported her to the police station without searching her.
There a police matron directed her to remove her outer clothing
preparatory to a search. After stripping to her undergarments,
the defendant removed a piece of folded tissue paper from her
authorized to search the person of the arrestee only in the event that he reasonably
feared an assault. On the other hand, there was the decision in Robinson.
Quoting from Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), and Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58 (1967), two Warren Court decisions reaffirming the authority of the states
to establish their own search and seizure standards provided federal rights were not
infringed, the court decided that Marsh, rather than Robinson, was controlling and
granted the motion to suppress.
Because the decision to suppress was "based solely on the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution," 353 N.Y.S.2d at 116, Kelly is not an "evasion" case
in the correct sense of the term. Apparently the New York court was under the impres-
sion that Sibron and Cooper had held that a state court may disagree with Supreme
Court interpretations of the fourth amendment so long as the state court's disagree-
ment works in favor of individual liberty. This view is, of course, erroneous. While
Sibron and Cooper do permit a state court to grant an individual more privacy under
state law then he would be entitled to under the fourth amendment, it is nevertheless
true that a state court is bound by authoritative Supreme Court interpretations of
federal constitutional protections. A state court may not extend federal rights beyond
the limits set by the Supreme Court, and any attempt to do so will result in the state
judgment being set aside by the Supreme Court. Oregon v. Hass, 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975).
See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
It is, however, possible to interpret Kelly as an "evasion" case. Under this view,
the language in the opinion regarding the fourth amendment is ignored. Instead, em-
phasis is placed on the court's reliance on Marsh in arriving at the conclusion that the
search was illegal. (Marsh, it will be remembered, originally was decided on the basis
of both federal and state law.) When Robinson is then interpreted as having eroded
the federal grounds of Marsh, Kelly can be viewed as a decision grounded solely on
New York law.
Interestingly, in Florida, where Robinson's companion case, Gustafson, origi-
nated, the impact of the Burger Court's decisions has been avoided by legislative
enactment rather than court decision. A statute enacted by the Florida legislature in
1974 has decriminalized almost all traffic offenses. See Ch. 74-377, (1974) Laws of
Florida 1187. With the exception of five serious offenses (including reckless driving and
driving while intoxicated), traffic violations in Florida are now nonarrestable infrac-
tions, and violators may be given a citation but not arrested. By eliminating much of
the authority of police officers to effect custodial arrests for traffic offenses, the statute
severely limits the number of instances in which the types of searches approved in
Robinson and Gustafson may be undertaken. While it would be intriguing to examine
the extent to which other state legislatures have avoided Burger Court decisions by
legislative enactment, such an inquiry would require a separate article.
23 520 P.2d 51 (Hawaii 1974).
1975]
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bra and handed it to the matron who, without any idea of what
was inside, opened it and found capsules containing barbitu-
rates. Thereafter the defendant was charged with unlawful pos-
session of drugs. Her motion to suppress the capsules on
grounds of unreasonable search and seizure was granted by the
trial court. The state appealed, claiming that the evidence had
been properly seized incident to a lawful custodial arrest.
In affirming the order of suppression, the Hawaii Supreme
Court recognized that under the rule laid down in Robinson
three months earlier, this seizure had not violated the defen-
dant's federally protected rights. 22 The determination that the
defendant's federal rights had not been violated was not, how-
ever, dispositive of the issue of whether the capsules had been
lawfully seized. Because it disagreed with the proposition-
implicit in Robinson-that a person under lawful arrest can
have no reasonable expectations of privacy, the court turned
to the question of whether the state constitutional provision
prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure had been com-
plied with in this case.
Relying in part on arguments derived from the dissenting
opinions in Robinson, the court had little difficulty concluding
that the seizure of the capsules, while permissible under federal
law, was impermissible under state law:
[A]s the ultimate judicial tribunal in this state, this court
has final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the
Hawaii Constitution. We have not hesitated in the past to
extend the protections of the Hawaii Bill of Rights beyond
those of textually parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of
Rights when logic and a sound regard for the purposes of
those protections have so warranted .... In our view, the
22 The court said:
In our interpretation of the United States Constitution, of course, we are
bound to follow applicable pronouncements by the United States Supreme
Court. There is no doubt that the search conducted in this case was reasona-
ble under the fourth amendment as construed in Robinson and Gustafson.
We have already indicated that the defendant's search at the police station
was incident to her custodial arrest; assuming that arrest to be lawful, the
search of her body and all personal effects in her possession did not violate
her federal constitutional rights since "the fact of [her] lawful arrest" alone
gave the police plenary authority to subject her to a detailed search.
Id. at 58.
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right to be free of "unreasonable" searches and seizures under
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution is enforceable
by a rule of reason which requires that governmental intru-
sions into the personal privacy of citizens of this State be no
greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the cir-
cumstances. In cases of searches incident to arrests, a con-
trary holding would lend unprecedented power to the police
to subject individuals under custodial arrest for even the
most trivial offenses to the indignities of an exhaustive body
search when no articulable reason supports such an intrusion
other than the bare fact that the arrestee is in custody ...
Certainly we are not prepared to hold, in interpreting the
Hawaii Constitution, that since a lawful custodial arrest is a
significant intrusion into an individual's privacy, further,
"lesser" intrusions may be made without regard for their jus-
tifications. . . .Indeed, we cannot say that a strip search is
a "lesser" intrusion into an individual's privacy than his loss
of freedom by arrest. The integrity of one's person including
the right to be free of arbitrary probing by government offi-
cials into the contents of the personal effects in one's posses-
sion is at least as significant in terms of human dignity as the
right to be free of externally imposed confinement.?
The court buttressed its opinion by observing that, under the
nation's federal system of government, a state court construing
a state constitutional provision is free to disagree with United
States Supreme Court constructions of similar federal constitu-
tional provisions whenever the state interpretation does not
entail denial of a federal right.
24
2 Id. at 58-59 (citations omitted).
21 The court said:
[W]e are of the opinion that as a search and seizure, the conduct of the
police in this case was unreasonable. While this results in a divergence of
meaning between words which are the same in both the federal and state
constitutions, the system of federalism envisaged by the United States Con-
stitution tolerates such divergence where the result is greater protection of
individual rights under state law than under federal law .... In this re-
spect, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court on the meaning of
the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" is merely another source of
authority, admittedly to be afforded respectful consideration, but which we
are free to accept or reject in establishing the outer limits of protection
afforded by article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution.
Id. at 58 n.6 (citations omitted).
1975]
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The California decision rejecting the Robinson rule on the
basis of state law is People v. Brisendine.25 In that case the
California Supreme Court repudiated the notion that an arrest
for any offense authorizes a full body search of the arrestee and
held instead that a policeman making an arrest for a traffic or
other minor offense is limited to conducting a good faith pat-
down search for weapons. 2 Replying to the state's contention
that Robinson and its companion case Gufstafson were control-
ling, the court said:
We disagree. Whether or not the instant case is distinguish-
able from Robinson-Gustafson, as defendant claims, we note
that those cases were decided under the Supreme Court's
view of the minimum standards required in order to satisfy
the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches. Our holding today is based exclusively on article I,
section 13, of the California Constitution, which requires a
more exacting standard for cases arising within this state.27
Moreover, the court made these statements concerning the ob-
ligation of a state court required to interpret a provision of its
own bill of rights:
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state consti-
tutions textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended
to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is
otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon the correspond-
ing provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the
reverse. "By the end of the Revolutionary period, the concept
of a Bill of Rights had been fully developed in the American
system. Eleven of the 13 states (and Vermont as well) had
enacted Constitutions to fill in the political gap caused by the
overthrow of British authority.... ... .Eight of the Revo-
lutionary Constitutions were prefaced by Bills of Rights,
while four contained guarantees of many of the most impor-
tant individual rights in the body of their texts. Included in
these Revolutionary constitutional provisions were all of the
rights that were to be protected in the federal Bill of Rights.
By the time of the Treaty of Paris (1783) then, the American
- 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
21 Id. at 1105-10, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 321-26.
2 Id. at 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
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inventory of individual rights had been virtually completed
and included in the different state Constitutions whether in
separate Bills of Rights or the organic texts themselves." In
particular, the Rights of the Colonists (Boston, 1772) de-
clared for the first time "the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures that was to ripen into the Fourth
Amendment," and that protection was embodied in every one
of the eight state constitutions adopted prior to 1789 which
contained a separate bill of rights.
We need not further extend this opinion to trace to their
remote origins the historical roots of state constitutional pro-
visions. Yet we have no doubt that such inquiry would con-
firm our view of the matter. The federal Constitution was
designed to guard the states as sovereignities against poten-
tial abuses of centralized government; state charters, how-
ever, were conceived as the first and at one time the only line
of protection of the individual against the excesses of local
officials. Thus in determining that California Citizens are
entitled to greater protection under the California Constitu-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures than that
required by the United States Constitution, we are embark-
ing on no revolutionary course. Rather we are simply reaf-
firming a basic principle of federalism-that the nation as a
whole is composed of distinct geographical and political enti-
ties bound together by a fundamental federal law but none-
theless independently responsible for safeguarding the rights
of their citizens.
28
Over the dissent of Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Mar-
shall, the Burger Court, in United States v. White, 9 held that
the fourth amendment is not violated when an undercover op-
erative engages in a conversation with a criminal suspect and,
without either a warrant or the suspect's consent, transmits the
conversation to law enforcement agents by means of an elec-
tronic device concealed on his person. The plurality opinion by
Justice White reasoned that there is no difference, for fourth
amendment purposes, between the risk that one's confidential
communications may be disclosed by the person to whom they
were made and the risk that the person in whom one confides
28 Id. at 1113-14, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30 (citations omitted).
21 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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may be wearing a surreptitious electronic transmitter. "
In People v. Beavers,3 the Michigan Supreme Court was
unpersuaded by Justice White's logic and instead found itself
in agreement with Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion:
Nevertheless, we are persuaded by the logic of Justice Harlan
which recognizes a significant distinction between assuming
the risk that communications directed to one party may sub-
sequently be repeated to others and the simultaneous moni-
toring of a conversation by the uninvited ear of a third party
functioning in cooperation with one of the participants yet
unknown to the other.
32
Accordingly, the court held that, absent consent, such "partici-
pant monitoring" was unlawful in Michigan unless pursuant to
a search warrant. 3  The court expressly noted that its "conclu-
sion is based upon the Michigan Constitution and the protec-
tion afforded the people of this state against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 4
In Williams v. Florida35 the Burger Court held that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not
prevent a state from enforcing a rule of criminal procedure
requiring a defendant to disclose before trial the names of his
alibi witnesses. The decision in Williams was evaded by the
Alaska Supreme Court in Scott v. State,36 a case in which the
defendant claimed that a pretrial court order granting broad
11 Id. at 750-52.
31 227 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1975).
12 Id. at 515.
31 Id. at 516.
34 Id.
" 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
" 519 P.2d 774 (Alas. 1974). Additionally, in Reynolds v. Superior Court, 528 P.2d
45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974), the California Supreme Court in dicta cast doubt on
whether a discovery order permissible under Williams would pass muster under the
California constitutional provision guaranteeing the privilege against self-
incrimination. The court said:
While Williams may have laid to rest the contention that notice-of-alibi
procedures are inconsistent with the federally guaranteed privilege against
self-incrimination, this privilege is also secured to the people of California
by our state Constitution, whose construction is left to this court, informed
but untrammelled by the United States Supreme Court's reading of parallel
federal provisions.
Id. at 49, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
[Vol. 63
MORE ON NEW FEDERALISM
discovery to the prosecution invaded his privilege against self-
incrimination under the fifth amendment and the correspond-
ing provision of the state constitution. Among other things, the
order of the trial court compelled the defendant to give advance
notice of his alibi defense and to furnish the prosecution with
the names of witnesses on whom he intended to rely in estab-
lishing his alibi defense.
The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed with the Williams
logic that a notice of alibi requirement is not violative of the
fifth amendment because it does not force the defendant to
provide incriminating information but simply to disclose his
alibi defense before trial rather than during trial. The state
court found this rationale so "unpersuasive"37 that it quoted
extensively from Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Wil-
liams,3" as well as from a law review note critical of Williams.9
Moreover, the court did not feel obligated to interpret a state
constitutional provision in accordance with what it considered
an unsatisfactory Supreme Court decision construing a parallel
provision of the Federal Constitution:
In Baker v. City of Fairbanks, we acknowledged our re-
sponsibility to depart whenever necessary from constitutional
interpretations enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court and to develop rights and privileges under the Alaska
constitution in accordance with our own unique legal back-
ground. In particular we stated:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional
standards imposed upon us by the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop
additional constitutional rights and privileges under our
Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental rights
and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of
our local constitutional language and to be necessary for
the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at
the core of our constitutional heritage. We need not
37 519 P.2d 774, 783.
1 Id. at 781-82, 784.
3, Id. at 784, citing Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85
HARv. L. REV. 994, 1007-08 (1972).
1975]
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stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitutional
direction from the highest court of the land. Instead, we
should be moving concurrently to develop and expound
the principles embedded in our constitutional law.
We are not bound to follow blindly a federal constitutional
construction of a fundamental principle if we are convinced
that the result is based on unsound reason or logic.
We are therefore persuaded to interpret article I, section
9, of the Alaska constitution more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court construed the fifth amendment in
Williams. We hold that the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination under the Alaska constitution prohibits exten-
sive pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceedings."
The court then ruled that the portion of the discovery order
compelling the defendant to disclose the names of his alibi
witnesses violated the state constitutional provision protecting
the privilege against self-incrimination, even though such dis-
closure was not violative of the federal constitutional privi-
lege.4"
The Burger Court's decision in Baldwin v. New York42 has
been circumvented by two state courts. In Baldwin it was held
that the sixth amendment right to jury trial, which was ex-
tended to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana,43 applies to prose-
cution for "serious" offenses but not "petty" ones. For purposes
of the sixth amendment, a "serious" offense was defined as an
offense punishable by more than six months in jail. Under
Baldwin, then, there is no federally guaranteed right to a jury
trial when the potential punishment does not exceed six
months' imprisonment.
In the South Dakota case of Parham v. Municipal Court,44
the petitioner had been charged with violating a municipal
ordinance forbidding driving while intoxicated. Apparently
because the maximum punishment for the violation was less
,0 Id. at 783, 785 (citations omitted).
4' Id. at 785-87.
42 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
43 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
11 199 N.W.2d 501 (S.D. 1972).
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than six months confinement, the municipal court denied his
pretrial request for a jury trial. The petitioner then sought a
writ of prohibition to restrain the municipal court from trying
him without a jury.
The South Dakota Supreme Court granted the writ. Al-
though the court realized that under Baldwin the violation
charged constituted a "petty" offense insofar as the sixth
amendment right to jury trial was concerned,4 5 it nevertheless
proceeded to satisfy itself that in view of the widespread con-
demnation of drunken driving, the offense of driving while in-
toxicated was "serious" enough to warrant a jury trial. 6 No-
where in its opinion did the court explicitly say that the basis
for its holding was the right to jury trial provision of the state
constitution. However, the court's reference to the "fundamen-
tal constitutional rights" of the accused, 7 particularly its de-
scription of "a person's rights to trial by jury" as "a fundamen-
tal right" compels one to conclude that the decision was
grounded on the right to jury trial guaranteed under state law.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court more clearly enunci-
ated the state law basis for its evasion of Baldwin. In State v.
Sklar,4" the court held that under a provision of the state con-
stitution protecting the right to trial by jury "[iun all criminal
prosecutions,"49 any criminal defendant in a Maine state court
is entitled to a jury trial, irrespective of whether the offense is
classified as "serious" or "petty" under the federal scheme.
The court therefore directed that a defendant accused of speed-
"Id. at 504.
" The court supported its decision by this rationale:
Today the drinking driver is a major cause of death, loss of limb, and the
destruction of property on the highway. Because of the consequences the
offense of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated must be considered mala
in se and cannot reasonably be characterized as minor, trivial, or petty.
Society regards the offense as serious. A conviction authorizes the imposition
of "grave criminal sanctions not comparable to petty crimes at common law
which were tried summarily".
Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
I' d.
" 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974).
" In pertinent part, this provision provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have a right ... [t]o have a speedy, public and impartial trial, and,
except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a jury of the vicinity." ME. CoNs.
art. 1, § 6 (1965).
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ing, an offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than
90 days, be given a jury trial."
The court knew that in Baldwin the Burger Court had
restricted the federal right to jury trial to so-called "serious"
offenses.' But because of historical and textual differences in
the two analagous constitutional provisions the court did not
regard Supreme Court interpretations of the scope of the fed-
eral constitutional right to trial by jury as "afford[ing] guid-
ance beneficial in the assessment of the scope of the trial by
jury guarantee of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of
Maine."
5 2
Recent Supreme Court decisions narrowly defining the
right to counsel clause of the sixth amendment were avoided
in the Michigan case of People v. Jackson.3 The issue in
Jackson was whether the defendant, convicted of attempted
robbery, was entitled to the assistance of counsel at a pretrial
lineup and a pretrial photographic identification. Since both
the lineup and the display of photographs had occurred after
arrest but prior to the filing of formal charges, it was clear that
under Kirby v. Illinois54 and United States v. Ash 5 the defen-
dant had no federally protected right to the presence of counsel
at the two pretrial identification sessions.
The Michigan Supreme Court gave "due consideration" to
"the Kirby and Ash opinions"56 but decided that they were
unacceptable because they failed "to preserve best evidence
eyewitness testimony from unnecessary alteration by unfair
identification procedures.'' 7 Accordingly, the court reversed
the conviction, holding that, "independent of any federal con-
50 317 A.2d 160, 171.
5, Id. at 164-65.
52 Id. at 165. The historical reason was this: the common law's serious-petty dis-
tinction for purposes of jury trial did not apply in Maine, which had historically
provided a jury trial in all criminal cases. The second reason was based on differences
in the wording of the federal and state constitutional provisions regarding jury trial,
referred to previously.
53 217 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 1974).
5' 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
55 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
217 N.W.2d 22, 27.
57 Id.
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stitutional mandate,"58 a Michigan defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel at any pretrial lineup or photographic
identification procedure. 9 The state law basis for the decision
was the court's "constitutional power to establish rules of evi-
dence applicable to judicial proceedings in Michigan courts."6
Kirby was again evaded in Commonwealth v. Richman.6
The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Richman
was whether the defendant was entitled to the assistance of
counsel at a lineup conducted after arrest but before the defen-
dant had been otherwise charged. The plurality opinion in
Kirby had determined that there was no such right under the
Constitution because the sixth amendment right to counsel did
not attach until "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.""2 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, sidestepped Kirby by
holding that under Pennsylvania law the "initiation of adver-
sary judicial criminal proceedings" occurs at the time of arrest,
whether with or without a warrant. 3 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the denial of counsel to the defendant had vio-
lated his rights. By holding that the formal criminal process
begins at an earlier state of the proceedings under state law
than under federal law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ex-
tended to the defendant a right which had been denied him
under federal law as interpreted by the Burger Court.
In Commonwealth v. Companal5 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court adopted the "single transaction" test of double
jeopardy, even though the court was aware that the Burger
Court had declined, in Ashe v. Swenson,66 to impose this test
upon the states through the fifth amendment double jeopardy
SId.
' Id. at 28.
"Id. at 27.
320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974).
,= Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). The plurality opinion represented the
views of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justice
Powell concurred in the result. Id. at 691.
' Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351, 353-54 (Pa. 1974).
"Id. at 354.
304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973).
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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clause, and had denied certiorari in several other cases in which
state convicts sought to raise the claim that the test is required
by the fifth amendment. 7 Although not completely free from
ambiguity, the language in Compana indicates that the deci-
sion was based on both the fifth amendment and provisions of
state law regarding double jeopardy. 8 Thus, it seems clear that
by grounding its decision at least partially on state law, the
Pennsylvania court intended to evade any future decision of
the Burger Court squarely holding that the "single transac-
tion" test is not the test by which to judge whether the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment has been violated. Dis-
satisfied with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's evasive deci-
sion, the Commonwealth filed a petition for certiorari under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(3). The Burger Court entered an order granting
the writ, vacating judgment, and remanding to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania for a determination of whether its judg-
ment was based on federal or state constitutional grounds, or
both. 9
On remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adhered to
its adoption of the "single transaction" test." At the same
time, the court carefully insulated its decision from unfavora-
ble review by stating:
There are, of course, indications in some of the opinions
supporting our judgments that a basis for the judgments was
to be found in federal constitutional problems. However,
there are also separate reason[s] advanced for the result that
do not stand on a view of federal constitutional requirements.
Our supervisory power over state criminal proceedings is
broad, and this Court need not, as a matter of state law, limit
its decision to the minimum requirements of federal constitu-
tional law ...
This Court views our May 4, 1973 judgments in
Compana as state law determinations pursuant to our super-
visory powers .
7
7 The cases were Grubb v. State, 497 P.2d 1305 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1017 (1972); State v. Miller; 484 P.2d 1132 (Ore. App. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1047 (1972).
' 304 A.2d at 434, 436-37, 441.
Pennsylvania v. Compana, 414 U.S. 808 (1973).
;' Commonwealth v. Compana, 314 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1974).
7' Id. at 855-56. Concerning this statement, a dissenting justice wrote:
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The Commonwealth then filed a second certiorari petition,
alleging that Compana was "a federal constitutional decision,
no matter what the Pennsylvania tribunal now wishes to label
it. ' '72 It asserted that the "Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
failed to comply with the remand order of this Honorable Court
and, in so doing, has attempted to abrogate the fundamental
concept of federalism which underlies our union."7 In spite of
this argument, the petition for certiorari was denied.
7 4
Apart from- the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's final
Compana decision, the only recent case grounded on state law
alone which sought to avoid a future rather than a past decision
of the Burger Court is People v. McIntyre.5 The issue in this
case was whether a person charged with crime has a right to
represent himself. The New York Court of Appeals was aware7
that the Supreme Court had already heard oral arguments in
a case raising the same issue,7 but concluded that it "need not
reach the question of whether the right to defend pro se is
To my mind the above statement is evasive and equivocal, and I cannot
subscribe to it. It represents a refusal to accept accountability for our deci-
sions on federal constitutional law and an unwillingness to leave to the
highest federal court the last word on questions of such law. If this court sees
fit to base a holding in a case upon its interpretation of the Federal Constitu-
tion, as it clearly did in Compana, then it must tolerate review of such a
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. It will not do, when our
decision is under challenge, to announce that we were merely exercising a
supervisory power.
Id. at 859 (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J.).
72 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9, Pennsylvania v. Compana, 417 U.S. 969
(1974).
" Id. at 10.
7' Pennsylvania v. Compana, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
73 324 N.E.2d 322, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1974). See also Burrows v. Superior Court,
529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974), in which the California Supreme Court held
that the state constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable search and seizure was
violated when prosecutorial authorities obtained copies of the defendant's bank records
without legal process. It is arguable that the California court rested its decision on state
rather than federal law because it believed that the Burger Court's decision in Califor-
nia Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), indicated that the Burger Court might
hold such a search and seizure permissible under the fourth amendment.
71 324 N.E.2d 322, 326, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 842.
11 Faretta v. California, cert. granted, 415 U.S. 975 (1974). Thereafter, on June 30,
1975, the Burger Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has, under the
sixth amendment, a right to proceed without counsel. 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
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founded in the Federal Constitution"78 because the right was
guaranteed under New York constitutional and statutory law.79
B. Cases Based on Federal and Nonfederal Grounds
Two of the three recent "evasion" cases resting on both
federal and state grounds appear to have been framed so as to
avoid possible Burger Court decisions eroding fourth amend-
ment protections. In Commonwealth v. Platou0 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that a seizure of marijuana by police
officers had violated the defendant's right to be free from un-
reasonable search and seizure under both the fourth amend-
ment and the corresponding state constitutional provision. The
Commonwealth then filed a certiorari petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1257(3) which failed to mention that the decision
rested on nonfederal as well as federal grounds.8' Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court denied the petition, determining that the
judgment was in fact based on state law.82
Similarly, in Adams v. State," both federal and state con-
stitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure
were held to have been violated by a court-ordered operation
to remove a bullet from the defendant's body. Although the
state's petition for certiorari made no mention of the state law
supporting the judgment," the Burger Court again denied cer-
tiorari because it appeared that the judgment was based on
adequate state grounds8
The third case grounded on both federal and state law
involved the issue of double jeopardy. The Michigan Supreme
Court in People v. White"6 was cognizant of the Burger Court's
refusal in Ashe to adopt the "single transaction" test of double
79 324 N.E.2d 322, 326, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 842.
79 Id.
312 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1973).
" See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 1-4, Pennsylvania v. Platou, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
92 Pennsylvania v. Platou, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
3 299 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. 1973).
11 See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 1-7, Indiana v. Adams, 415 U.S. 935
(1974).
" Indiana v. Adams, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
86 212 N.W.2d 222 (Mich. 1973).
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jeopardy for the states.87 But it also knew that by statute or
case law the test had been approved in a number of states as
the appropriate standard for evaluating a claim of double jeop-
ardy.88 Therefore, the court held that the test was to be followed
in Michigan under the authority of the double jeopardy provi-
sions of both the fifth amendment and the state constitution.
8 9
Like Compana, White was apparently aimed at evading any
future decision of the Burger Court holding the "single transac-
tion" test inappropriate for determining whether the fifth
amendment double jeopardy clause has been invaded.
II.
THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED EvAsION
The denials of certiorari in Compana, Platou, and Adams
are not without significance. They tend to support the conclu-
sion that the Burger Court is not prepared to alter the adequate
state ground doctrine, even in instances in which the doctrine
is being utilized by a state court to insulate its judgment from
Supreme Court review. In one other case the Burger Court
exhibited a similar disinclination to modify the doctrine, al-
though again the doctrine operated to preclude the Court from
reexamining a judgment which granted a defendant broader
rights under state law than he would be entitled to under fed-
eral law.
In People v. Jones" an intermediate California appellate
court affirmed an order suppressing conversations intercepted
by electronic surveillance. Although the evidence had been ob-
tained by federal law enforcement agents in conformity with
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 196811 and was admissible in federal court, the evidence was
held to have been properly suppressed under a state statute




" Id at 227-28.
106 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
"18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1971).
12 106 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751. In response to the state's contention that the state
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After unsuccessfully petitioning the California Supreme
Court for review, the state filed. an appeal with the Burger
Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). The state's
jurisdictional statement 3 and several amicus curiae briefs filed
by California prosecutorial officials94 requested review on the
ground that the state statute was preempted under Title III.
The defendant's motion to dismiss or affirm raised two argu-
ments in support of the judgment below: First, no substantial
federal question was presented because a state is free to furnish
guarantees of privacy greater than those provided under federal
law;95 and second, the decision below "was based on an ade-
quate non-federal basis."9 The Burger Court dismissed the
appeal for want of a substantial federal question.
There are indications, however, that the Burger Court may
be on the verge of modifying the adequate state ground doc-
trine in "evasion" cases in which a criminal judgment rests on
both federal and nonfederal grounds. This author's earlier arti-
cle suggested that one step the Court might take to deal with
state court evasion would be to redefine the doctrine so as to
permit review of the federal aspects of a state judgment sup-
ported by federal and nonfederal grounds. That article stated:
The Court could adopt the position that the rule is not juris-
dictional, thus establishing its power to review state judg-
ments even though supported by an adequate nonfederal
ground. Then in a case involving a federal question, the Court
statute conflicted with Title III, the court said:
The California law requiring exclusion of evidence does not conflict with
these provisions of the federal law. The protection of privacy afforded by the
federal standard has been increased, but in no way have the federal officers'
powers to gather information under federal law been diminished by Califor-
nia's refusal to accept information provided by federal officers.
Id.
I' Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 6-12, California v. Jones, 414 U.S. 804
(1973).
" Brief for Evelle J. Younger as Amicus Curiae at 5-11, California v. Jones, 414
U.S. 804 (1973); Brief for Cecil Hicks as Amicus Curiae at 4-11, California v. Jones,
414 U.S. 804 (1973).
" Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm Appeal from State Court at 3-5, Califor-
nia v. Jones, 414 U.S. 804 (1973).
96 Id. at 6-8.
,7 California v. Jones, 414 U.S. 804 (1973),
, Wilkes, supra note 12, at 449.
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could exercise its power of review and affirm the judgment if
the federal question had been decided correctly. If the federal
question had been decided erroneously, the Court could cor-
rect the federal question and vacate, but not reverse, the
judgment, leaving the state court free on remand to reinstate
its prior judgment, but only on state grounds.9
In Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa
Corp.,'00 the Burger Court appears to have adopted this sugges-
tion in reviewing a state judgment in a civil case. The Colorado
Court of Appeals had held that a pollution inspector's search
violated a corporation's right to due process of law, as well as
its right to privacy under the fourth amendment. ' It was un-
clear from the language of the opinion whether the due process
right infringed was that guaranteed under the fourteenth
amendment, the state constitution, or both.' °2 The pollution
board then sought certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) on the
ground that there had been no unreasonable search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Ordinarily, under these circumstances the proper proce-
dure would be for the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the
judgment, and remand the case to the state court for a determi-
nation of whether the judgment rested on federal or nonfederal
grounds, or both.13 Instead, the Court granted certiorari, re-
viewed the fourth amendment claim on its merits, found it
unjustified, and reversed and remanded for a determination of
whether federal or state due process of law, or both, had been
violated.'04
Assuming that the Burger Court adopts the Western
Alfalfa approach in connection with its review of state criminal
judgments, there is no reason to believe that state court evasion
will be thwarted. Use of the new approach will simply permit
the Court to correct federal errors in judgments resting on both
Id.
,® 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
"' Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P.2d 907, 909-10 (Colo.
App. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
,o2 See 416 U.S. at 866 & n.6.
, See, e.g., California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).




federal and nonfederal grounds. On remand the state courts
will be free to reinstate their judgments, provided that they do
so on state grounds alone. Moreover, the technique will not
affect evasion cases resting on state law alone.
CONCLUSION
Since this author's earlier article was prepared, the Burger
Court has continued along its course of narrowly interpreting
the federally protected rights of criminal suspects. As a result,
increasing numbers of state courts have resolved to more fully
secure the rights of the accused, deliberately resting their deci-
sions on state grounds to avoid the possibility of unfavorable
Supreme Court review. Although the Burger Court may be on
the brink of modifying the adequate state ground doctrine in
cases based on both federal and nonfederal substantive
grounds, there is no evidence that this will interfere with the
new found desire of some state courts to provide more extensive
protection to the criminal defendant. If the present trend is any
indication, then, state courts will play an increasingly indepen-
dent role in defining the rights afforded criminal defendants.
Some state courts, to be sure, will remain content to interpret
state constitutional provisions in light of recent Burger Court
decisions, but others will continue to take up the challenge to
"make federalism more than a cliche for judicial conservatism,
and state's rights more than a slogan for obstructionism."'' 5
"I Project Report, Toward An Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. CIv.
RIowrs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 271, 275 (1973).
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